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1 Introduction
Evidential meaning (of grammatical evidentials) is generally analyzed as a type of not-
at-issue meaning.1 But what kind of not-at-issue meaning is it? The current contenders
are: presupposition (of an otherwise modal operator) (e.g., Izvorski (1997), Matthewson
et al. (2007)), illocutionary modifier (Faller 2002), or conventional implicature (Potts 2007b;
McCready 2010). This paper reviews the empirical properties of each of these types of
meaning and evaluates the Cuzco Quechua reportative against them. It argues in particular
against a recent proposal by McCready (2010) to recast Faller’s (2002) illocutionary analysis
of the reportative as a conventional implicature. The reason a conventional implicature
analysis cannot work is that a sentence with the reportative does not assert p – the speaker
does not convey that they believe p – but nevertheless pro↵ers p as at-issue content.
The Cuzco Quechua enclitic =si (allomorph =s) is part of a paradigm consisting of three2
enclitics with evidential functions, illustrated in (1) and (2).
(1) a. para-mu-sha-n=si
rain-cisl-prog-3=rep
p=‘It is raining.’
ev=s was told that it is raining
b. para-mu-sha-n=mi/=cha´
rain-cisl-prog-3=bpg/conj
p=‘It is raining.’
ev=s has direct evidence for the claim that it is raining/conjectures that it might
be raining
(2) mana=s
not=rep
phalay-ta
fly-acc
ati-n=chu,
can-3=neg
ichaqa
but
qucha-man=si
lake-illa=rep
apa-n-ku
take-3-pl
urqu
mountain
pata-cha-man
top-dim-illa
1In giving the translations of the Quechua examples, the evidential value EV is presented on a separate
line from the propositional content p. Abbreviations used in glosses: 1,2,3: 1st, 2nd, 3rd person; 1o: 1st
person object; 3s2o: 3rd person subject 2nd person object; abl: ablative; acc: accusative; add: additive;
ag: agentive; aug: augmentative; ben: benefactive; bpg: best possible grounds; caus: causative; cert:
certainty; cisl: cislocative; com: comitative; cond: conditional; conj: conjecture; contr: contrastive;
dim: diminuitive; disc: discontinuative; fut: future; hort: hortative; illa: illative; impr: impressive;
incl: inclusive; inch: inchoative; lim: limitative; loc: locative; neg: negation; nmlz: nominalizer;
nx.pst: non-experienced past; pl: plural; pol: polarity; pp: past participle; prog: progressive; pst: past;
rep: reportative; top: topic.
2Faller (2011) also includes the enclitic combination chu-sina in the set of evidential enclitics.
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p=‘It cannot fly, but they take it to the lake, to the top of a small mountain.’
ev: s was told that p (Conversation)
The arguments against analyzing the Cuzco Quechua reportative as contributing at-issue
meaning or a presupposition have mostly been made before, but it is useful to have these
repeated to allow direct comparison with the argument against analyzing it as contribut-
ing a conventional implicature. Taken together with its ability to take question acts in its
scope (see section 2.3), the impossibility of analyzing this evidential as contributing nei-
ther a presupposition nor a conventional implicature strengthens my analysis of it as an
illocutionary modifier (Faller 2002). Apart from making this point for the Cuzco Quechua
reportative, the main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need to study the empirical
properties, in particular the projection behavior, of an element carefully before classifying
it as a particular meaning type. Indeed, just as Potts (2005, 2007a) has (re-)established
conventional implicatures as a distinguished class of meaning based on their empirical dif-
ferences with presuppositions, I believe a case is to be made for distinguishing illocutionary
meaning as a separate type of not-at-issue meaning based on empirical di↵erences with both
presuppositions and conventional implicatures.
In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly review my basic theoretical assumptions.
I assume a fairly traditional view of speech acts, according to which there is a grammatical
level of meaning that encodes aspects of illocutionary force, F (Searle 1969; Vanderveken
1990). F applies to propositional content p to form a speech act F (p). Linguistic devices,
including sentence mood, intonation, performative verbs, and particles contribute to F, al-
though what speech act is performed in any particular utterance situation will also depend
on context and speaker intentions. Declarative sentence mood typically correlates with as-
sertive illocutionary force (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Vanderveken 1990), and so a typical
utterance u of the sentence It is raining will be an assertion. In Searle and Vanderveken’s
framework of speech acts, F consists of six components, including illocutionary point and a
set of felicity conditions. I will here only refer to sincerity conditions sinc, which require the
speaker to have a particular attitude towards p in order for the speech act to be sincere. For
example, an assertion of It is raining by speaker s has the sincerity condition that s believes
p. Schematically, we can represent these di↵erent components as in (3).3
(3) a. u: “It is raining.”
b. p = It is raining
c. asserts(it is raining)
d. sinc: speaker believes p
Illocutionary modifiers can add additional conditions to the speech act. For example,
the adverb alas adds the sincerity condition that the speaker laments that p (Vanderveken
1990:150):
(4) a. u: “Alas, it is raining.”
b. p = It is raining
3I display the sincerity conditions on a separate line in (3) for better readability, though they should be
considered a component of assert.
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c. asserts(it is raining)
d. sinc: speaker believes p, speaker laments that p
Faller (2002) develops an analysis of the CQ evidentials in (1) as illocutionary modifiers
which contribute a sincerity condition. For example, the reportative adds a sincerity condi-
tion that the speaker has been told that p by someone else. Because the relationship between
F and p is that of functor(argument), this analysis makes the prediction that evidentials have
wide scope with respect to elements that contribute to p. It also allows for the possibility of
scope interactions with other illocutionary operators.
In recent years, the term at-issue has been used to refer to p, the proposition expressed,
or Grice’s ‘what is said’ (Potts 2005:7). This term captures the idea that at-issue content
carries the main theme of the discourse or controversial propositions, while propositions
conveyed as presuppositions or conventional implicatures are backgrounded or de-emphasized
and not taken to be controversial. Simons et al. (2011) make this idea more precise by
linking it to Roberts’ (1996) question under discussion (QUD) as in (5) (simplified, as it
only considers assertions, not questions).
(5) A proposition p is at-issue relative to a question Q i↵ it entails a partial or complete
answer to QUD.
For example, in the context of the question in (6a), only the proposition expressed by
the main clause of (6a), I spent part of every summer . . . with my grandmother entails an
answer to the QUD. This proposition is therefore at-issue. But the proposition expressed by
the relative clause My grandmother lived in . . .Boston does not entail an answer to (6a), so
is not at-issue.
(6) a. Where did you spend your summers as a child?
b. I spent part of every summer until I was ten with my grandmother, who lived in
a working-class suburb of Boston. (Judith Thurman, ‘Doing it in the road’, The
New Yorker, June 10, 2002, p. 86, cited in Potts (2005:6)).
There are various types of not-at-issue meanings, including presuppositions, conventional
implicatures, and conversational implicatures. I will not discuss conversational implicatures
in this paper as the meaning conveyed by the CQ evidentials is uncontroversially lexically
encoded and so analyzing it as a conversational implicature is out of the question. In contrast,
presuppositions4 and conventional implicatures are, like at-issue meaning, encoded by lexical
items or constructions.
Presuppositions are propositions that, under normal circumstances, are taken by the
speaker to be part of the common ground, that is, taken as true by both speaker and
addressee.5 As such, they convey old information and this information is backgrounded with
respect to the at-issue content. For example, (7a) presupposes (7b).
(7) a. Conner stopped smoking.
4Conventional presuppositions, to be precise. Potts (2005) also distinguishes a class of conversationally
triggered presuppositions.
5If a presupposition is not in the common ground, it can often be accommodated, that is, the addressee will
accept it as true despite being new information to them.
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b. Conner used to smoke.
Conventional implicatures, first identified as a separate class of meanings by Grice (1989),
have experienced a renewed surge of interest in linguistics after Potts (2005) convincingly
demonstrated that they are indeed a distinguishable class of meanings. Potts identified a
set of properties, to be discussed in more detail in section 2, that set them apart from both
at-issue content and presuppositions. Conventional implicatures are commitments that are
made by the speaker of the utterance,6 and are logically and compositionally independent
of the at-issue entailments (Potts 2005:11). Moreover, conventional implicatures typically
convey new information. Potts identifies two broad classes of conventional implicatures that
exhibit these characteristics: supplements, exemplified in (8), and expressives, (9).
(8) a. As-parentheticals:
Ames was, as the press reported, a successful spy.
b. Supplementary relative:
Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
(9) a. Expressive adjectives:
I have to mow the damn lawn.
b. Honorifics:
Sensei-wa
the.teacher-subj
eigo
English
ga
nom
o-wakari-ni
hon-understanding-dat
nar-u.
become-imp
‘The teacher understands English.’ (Toribo (1990), cited in Potts (2005:180))
In the next section, I will look in detail at the empirical properties that distinguish the
three types of conventional not-at-issue meanings from each other and from at-issue content.
2 Properties of conventional implicatures, presupposi-
tions, illocutionary modifiers (vs. at-issue meaning)
Illocutionary modifiers, conventional implicatures, and presuppositions all have distinct char-
acteristics that follow from their particular way of contributing meaning. They have in com-
mon that they are not at-issue, that is, they do not answer the QUD, and as a consequence,
none of them are directly deniable. Presuppositions, as commented above, contribute infor-
mation that is assumed to be known already by the interlocutors, and as a consequence are
backgrounded with respect to at-issue content. However, the truth of the at-issue content is
dependent on the truth of any presuppositions in as much as the truth of the at-issue content
cannot be evaluated (that is, is undefined), when the presuppositions are false. Because pre-
suppositions are assumed to be shared knowledge, they cannot ‘simultaneously be presented
as denied, or hypothesized or queried’ (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000:352). This ex-
plains why they project from so-called holes like negation, questions, and the antecedents of
6The properties identified by Potts as classifying conventional implicatures, especially speaker-orientation,
are not uncontroversial (Amaral et al. 2007), but for the purposes of this paper, I will assume that an
element that meets these can be classed as a conventional implicature.
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if-clauses. However, presuppositions do not project from so-called plugs like verbs of saying
or propositional attitudes.
In contrast, conventional implicatures are truth-conditionally independent of the truth
value of the at-issue content. They are speaker-oriented and cannot be backgrounded like
presuppositions. They are scopally inert, that is they do not interact with at-issue elements
at all, resulting in them projecting from both holes and plugs. As we will see in section
3, Potts captures these properties by postulating that conventional implicatures occupy a
meaning dimension that is independent from the at-issue dimension: <at-issue content,
conventional implicatures>.
Illocutionary modifiers contribute felicity conditions to the speech act level meaning.
Speech act level meaning F is at a hierarchically higher level of meaning than at-issue content
p in that F takes p as its argument: F (p). It follows from this that illocutionary modifiers
have wide scope over any at-issue level operator. That is, they cannot embed (unless, one
admits, with Krifka (2014), embedded speech acts). If, as in the case of sincerity conditions,
they index someone’s attitude/mental state, it will be that of a speech act participant, that
is, speaker or addressee.
I will look at each of these properties for the Cuzco Quechua reportative in comparison
with English illocutionary modifiers such as alas, and typical conventional implicature and
presuppositional elements. It will emerge that the reportative behaves in the same way
as recognized illocutionary modifiers and that both types of element share key properties
with conventional implicatures, which makes an analysis of these elements as conventional
implicatures not implausible. However, there are also significant di↵erences, especially re-
garding their projection behaviour, which argue against assimilating them to conventional
implicatures. Moreover, I will argue in section 3 that existing analyses of conventional impli-
catures cannot account for the Cuzco Quechua reportative because they either require that
the speaker is committed to p, or that the proposition conveyed by p is not at-issue. The
speech act analysis of this evidential captures that p is not asserted but still pro↵ered as
at-issue content.
2.1 Answering the QUD and direct denial
By definition, not-at-issue elements cannot provide an answer to the QUD. As they do not
contribute to what is under discussion, they can also not be the target of direct disagreements
such as That’s not true. In order to disagree with not-at-issue content, more specialised forms
need to be used, such as, Well, yes, but . . . (Karttunen and Peters (1979), cited in Potts
(2005:51)), hey, wait a minute, etc. The ‘Hey, wait a minute’ test is illustrated for the
existence presupposition of the definite NP the king of France in (10) (von Fintel 2004). As
indicated, only the presupposition of (10a) that there is a King of France can be denied with
Hey, wait a minute’, whereas That’s not true can only access the at-issue content that he
attended APEC.
(10) a. A: The king of France attended the APEC conference this week.
b. B: Hey, wait a minute – I had no idea that France is still a monarchy.
c. B’: #Hey, wait a minute – I had no idea that he was at that conference.
d. C: That’s not true – He wasn’t at that conference.
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e. C’: #That’s not true – France isn’t a monarchy.
Applying this test to conventional implicatures and illocutionary modifiers confirms that
they also do not contribute to at-issue content. Consider (11a). The supplementary relative
who stole from the FBI and the illocutionary modifier alas cannot be denied with the direct
rebuttal That’s not true, but can be questioned with Hey, wait a minute.7
(11) a. Alas, Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
b. That’s not true – He’s not in prison./#He didn’t steal from the FBI./#You’re
not really sad about him being in prison.
c. Hey, wait a minute – He didn’t steal from the FBI./ You’re not really sad about
him being in prison./#He’s not in prison.
The Cuzco Quechua reportative =si is also not at-issue, as it does not entail an answer to
the QUD. Thus, only the proposition It cannot fly in (12b), not the claim that the speaker
was told this, entails an answer to the QUD in (12a).
(12) a. phalay-ta
fly-acc
atin=chu
can=pol
‘Can it fly? (Constructed)
b. mana=s
not=rep
phalay-ta
fly-acc
ati-n=chu
can-3=neg
p=‘It cannot fly . . . ’ (Conversation)
ev: s was told that p
As expected, the reportative meaning can also not be directly denied. (13b), but not
(13a), is a felicitous denial of (12b).8
(13) a. mana=n
not=bpg
chiqaq=chu
true=neg
ni
no
pi=pas
who=add
chay-ta
this-acc
willa-ra-sunki=chu
tell-pst-3s2o=neg
‘That’s not true. Nobody told you this.’
b. mana=n
not=bpg
chiqaq=chu
true=neg
phalay-ta=puni=n
fly-acc=cert=bpg
ati-n
can-3
‘That’s not true. It can definitely fly.’
Having established that the Cuzco Quechua reportative is not at-issue, let us now turn
to the other properties.
2.2 (In)dependence of truth values
One of the hallmarks of conventional implicatures is that their truth value is completely
independent of that of their host sentence. In contrast, presuppositions must be assumed to
7Though see Potts (2012) for examples in which a conventional implicature can also be denied directly.
8I have currently no data that would correspond to the ‘Hey wait a minute’ test. However, the inability to
be targeted by direct denials seems su cient for concluding that the reportative is not at-issue.
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be true in order for their host sentence to have a truth value. Thus, as shown in (14) it is
not possible to deny the truth of a presupposition while at the same time assenting to the
truth of the at-issue content.
(14) a. A: Conner stopped smoking.
b. B: #That’s great news, but he didn’t actually smoke.
In contrast, it is fine to deny the truth of a conventional implicature while assenting to
the truth of the at-issue proposition, as shown in (15).
(15) a. A: Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
b. B: That’s great news, but he stole from the CIA, you know.
The illocutionary modifier alas and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conven-
tional implicatures, as shown in (16) and (17), respectively; that is, it is possible to assent
to p while denying the contribution of these two markers.
(16) a. A:Alas, Jo couldn’t come.
b. B: Right, so we’re only 5 then. But be honest, you are not really sad that she’s
not here.
(17) a. A: Juan=si
Juan=rep
vaka-ta=qa
cow-acc=top
suwa-sqa
steal-nx.pst
p=‘Juan stole the cow.’
ev: s was told that Juan stole the cow
b. B: ari
yes
pay=mi
he=bpg
ka-rqa-n
be-pst-3
ichaqa
but
ni
no
pi=pas
who=add
willa-ru-sunki
tell-hort-3s2o
qan
you
kiki=yki
self=2
riku-ra=nki
see-pst=2
riki
right
‘Yes, it was him. But nobody told you this. You saw it yourself, didn’t you.’
2.3 Speaker-orientation
Conventional implicatures are, according to Potts, necessarily speaker-oriented,9 while pre-
suppositions are not. We can test this by checking whether the meaning of a conventional
implicature or presuppositional element embedded under a propositional attitude can be
denied by the speaker. If it can be denied, then it follows that the element in question is
not (necessarily) speaker-oriented. As shown in (18), this is not possible for the expressive
conventional implicature of jerk, but it is possible for the presupposition triggered by stop.
(18) a. Sue wrongly believes that that jerk Conner got promoted. #In fact, he isn’t a
jerk.
9This claim has been argued to be false – see, for example, Amaral et al. (2007) – and in later work, for ex-
ample Potts (2007b), Potts has revised this, allowing for perspective shifts to salient attitude holders/judges
in the context.
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b. Sue wrongly believes that Conner stopped smoking. However, he never smoked
in the first place.
This test applied to illocutionary modifiers, as in (19), shows that they, like conventional
implicatures, are speaker-oriented.
(19) Sue believes that Conner, alas, was made redundant. #But I’m happy that he was
made redundant.
However, this test only shows speaker-orientation for illocutionary modifiers in asser-
tions. Some illocutionary modifiers, for example honestly in (20), change their orientation
to the addressee in questions (this has become known as interrogative flip (Tenny and Speas
2003)), and so are then not speaker-oriented. The restriction for such illocutionary modi-
fiers is therefore better described as orientation towards a speech act participant. This still
distinguishes them from presuppositions, which can be oriented towards the subject of an
attitudinal verb, which is the main contrast we are interested in here.
(20) Honestly, who asked who out? (Internet (Faller 2002:237))
Note that not all illocutionary modifiers participate in the interrogative flip. For example,
alas remains anchored to the speaker in (21).10
(21) Is it, alas, raining?
Thus, illocutionary modifiers pattern again with conventional implicatures for this prop-
erty, although for some, speaker-orientation has to broadened to speech act participant
orientation.
Applying this test to the Cuzco Quechua reportative is not straightforward, as it cannot,
in general, embed. For example, it cannot occur in the antecedent of conditionals or in the
complements of perception verbs (Faller 2002). However, the reportative can occur in the
complement of the verb niy ‘say’, if this complement is a fully finite clause,11 and so we can
apply the test with this verb. Consider the naturally occurring examples in (22).
(22) a. chhaynata=taq
then=contr
ni-mu-n-ku
say-cisl-3-pl
kay
this
wiraqocha
gentleman
Carlos
Carlos
Ferrero,
Ferrero
kay
this
wiraqocha-wan=sis
gentleman-com=rep
rima-yu-nqa-ku
speak-aug-3.fut-pl
kunan
now
p’unchaw
day
‘Then they say (that) this gentleman Carlos Ferrero, with this gentleman, re-
portedly, they will talk today.’ (Radio)
10Moreover it seems to introduce a bias, such that the speaker expects the answer to be positive (cf. Rett
(2013)). This seems to be due to the fact that in order for a speaker to lament p they have to believe p.
11The reportative is not possible within the complement of niy if it is a nominalized clause (Faller 2002:222).
Note that it is not entirely clear whether the examples in (22) constitute true embedding. According to
Lefebvre and Muysken (1988:12), non-nominalized complement clauses contain the complementizer chay
‘that’, which is however not present in (22a,b). It is therefore possible that these contain two independent
clauses.
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b. chay
this
faena-pi
faena-loc
ni-ra-n
say-pst-3
Inka
Inka
Qosqo-ta
Cusco-acc
hatari-chi-sha-qti-n=si
raise-caus-prog-nmlz-3=rep
machula-nchis-kuna
ancestor-1pl.incl-pl
tiya-q
sit-ag
hina=s
like=rep
lliw=si
all=rep
panpa
plain
‘At this faena he said that when the Inka built Cusco, where our ancestors lived,
everything was plains, like this.’
(Valderrama Fernandez and Escalante Gutierrez 1982:19)
In both examples, and all the other examples I have been able to find, the reportative
seems to be interpreted only in concord with the verb of saying, that is, they jointly convey
the meaning that someone else related the information in the complement clause. While it
is of course possible that the subject of niy ‘say’ in turn also heard this from other people,
this is, according to the speaker I have consulted, not necessarily so.12 This would suggest
that the reportative is speaker-oriented in assertions.
The reportative can participate in interrogative flip, that is, in questions, it can be
interpreted with respect to the addressee. An example is given in (23).
(23) Context: A son announces to his father that a young man has come to see him. The
father sends him to let him in and asks:
may-manta=s
where-abl=rep
chay
this
runa
man
ka-n-man
be-3-cond
‘Where could this man be from?’ (Itier 1995:290)
That is, as with illocutionary modifiers, it is better to describe this property for the
Cuzco Quechua reportative as orientation towards a speech act participant.
In addition to the flip reading in questions, the Cuzco Quechua reportative has a reading
in which it is still speaker oriented, as shown in (24).
(24) Context: Martina asks the mother-in-law of her consultant how she is. The mother-
in-law doesn’t hear her, so the consultant asks her the following:
imayna=s
how=rep
ka-sha-nki
be-prog-2
‘(She says) How are you?’ (Conversation, reconstructed from memory)
Under this reading, the question is asked by the speaker on someone else’s behalf. The
question as a whole is reported. Faller (2002) takes this as strong support for the illocutionary
analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative, as it has scope here over the entire question speech
act.
12I have only checked this with one speaker so far, and only by talking about it with them at a meta level,
by asking them whether the unspecified subject of niy could have first hand knowledge of p. This claim
therefore requires further support from a proper investigation with more than one speaker.
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2.4 (Anti-)Backgrounding
Presuppositions are propositions that under normal circumstances are taken by the speaker
to be part of the common ground. As such, they convey old, backgrounded information. For
example, the verb know presupposes its complement. In (25), the complement conveys the
old information that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor; the new information is the claim
that most riders know this.
(25) Most riders know that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor.
In contrast, conventional implicatures tend to introduce new information, albeit in a de-
emphasized manner (Potts 2005:33). Thus, in (26), the information that Ames stole from
the FBI would normally be new information.
(26) Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
According to Potts (2005:33), conventional implicatures are not only not backgrounded,
but have a stronger requirement: anti-backgrounding. That is, conventional implicatures
are infelicitous in contexts in which their content is already known. The second sentence
of (27a) is infelicitous in the context of the first, which asserts the content of the nominal
appositive. The parallel discourse in (27b) with a presupposition is perfectly fine.
(27) a. Ames stole from the FBI. #When Ames, who stole from the FBI, was finally
caught, he was put behind bars.
b. Ames stole from the FBI. When they realized that he stole from the FBI, they
put him behind bars.
Illocutionary modifiers vary with regard to backgrounding. Illocutionary modifiers ex-
pressing preparatory conditions are presuppositional and therefore backgrounded. For ex-
ample, in making a request, the speaker takes for granted that the addressee has the ability
to perform the ordered action; in making a promise or concession the speaker assumes that
the addressee wants the promised/conceded thing to happen. The adverbial phrases in (28,
in italics) express these preparatory conditions overtly.
(28) a. Since you are so good at this, let’s try it one more time with our eyes closed.
(google.co.uk)
b. Ok then, I’ll make it an editable since you want it so much. (google.co.uk)
As shown in (29), the sentences in (28) are felicitous in a context in which the content of
the illocutionary adverbials has been previously asserted.
(29) a. You are really good at this. So, since you are so good at this . . .
b. You really want it to be editable, don’t you? Ok then, since you want it so much,
I’ll make it an editable.
However, other illocutionary modifiers do not require backgrounding nor anti-backgrounding.
For example, alas in (30a) conveys new information, but it is also felicitous in a context in
which its meaning has already been established (30b).
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(30) a. Alas, it is raining.
b. It’s very lamentable, but, alas, it is raining.
The Cuzco Quechua reportative also requires neither backgrounding nor anti-backgrounding.
For example, the question posed in (31a) does not anticipate that the answer might be based
on reportative evidence. It is possible that one of the addresses could have seen a train for
themselves when visiting a region that already had trains or that an addressee would make
a conjecture. Thus, the reportative in (31b) and (31c) conveys new information.
(31) Context: the speaker describes the reactions of people when the train first came
to their region.
a. tren
train
tren
train
imayna=cha´
how=conj
‘The train, the train, how might it be?’
b. kuru
bug
hina=s
like=rep
suchu-n
crawl-3
‘It crawls like a bug (they say).’
c. yana
black
animal=si
animal=rep
‘It’s a black animal.’
(Valderrama Fernandez and Escalante Gutierrez 1982:30)
However, the reportative is also felicitous in contexts in which it is already established
that the current statement is based on reportative evidence. Thus, in (32), the first sentence
asserts that the speaker was told something, namely what follows. The reportative is then
still used in the recounting of the news story.
(32) chaymanta-pas
then-add
willay-man-chis
tell-1o-pl
[. . . ] qaynuchay
yesterday
p’unchay-taq=sis
day-contr=rep
huk
one
wayna
young.man
arma-ntin=sis
weapon-incl=rep
ka-n-man
be-3-cond
ka-ra-n
be-3-pst
hinaspa
then
wan˜u-ra-chi-pu-sqa
die-caus-ben-nx.pst
enamorada-n-ta.
girl.friend-3-acc
‘We are also told (the following). Yesterday there was a young man with a weapon,
he then killed his girlfriend.’ (Radio news)
Illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative are therefore distinct from
both presuppositions and conventional implicatures with respect to (anti-)backgrounding.
2.5 Projection from holes
Because a presupposed proposition is already assumed to be true, it cannot ‘simultane-
ously be presented as denied, or hypothesized or queried’ (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet
2000:352). This explains why they project from holes like negation, questions, and the
antecedents of if-clauses (Karttunen 1973). The so-called family of sentences test which
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involves these constructions is applied to the presupposition trigger stop in (33). Like the
simple assertion in (33a), its negation, corresponding question, and conditional with the
trigger in the antecedent in (33b–d) all still presuppose (33e).
(33) a. Conner stopped smoking.
b. Conner didn’t stop smoking.
c. Did Conner stop smoking?
d. If Conner stopped smoking, Sue will stop, too.
e. Conner used to smoke.
As shown in (34), conventional implicatures also project in the same way. That is, each
of (34a–d) presupposes (34e).
(34) a. Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.
b. Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now not behind bars.
c. Is Ames, who stole from the FBI, now behind bars?
d. If Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars, we can all relax.
e. Ames stole from the FBI.
Applying the family of sentences test to illocutionary modifiers yields results that are
somewhat di cult to interpret, though especially the interaction with negation shows that
they do not project in the expected way. (35) replicates the family of sentences test for alas.
(35) a. Alas, it is raining.
b. It is not, alas, raining. / Alas, it is not raining.
c. Is it, alas, raining?
d. If it is, alas, raining, we won’t go for a hike.
e. Speaker laments that it is raining.
Alas in (35b) has wide scope over negation. What is lamented is the fact that it is not
raining. However, this is not projection. If it were, the meaning conveyed by alas should
still be (35e), that the speaker laments the fact that it is raining. With polar questions and
conditional antecedents, alas seems to add a biased assumption that it is raining, and it is
this assumption that is lamented. That is, (35c,d), arguably still convey (35e), though this
does not seem to be projection in the usual sense, as whether or not the speaker laments p
depends on whether the truth of p is confirmed.
Turning now to the Cuzco Quechua reportative, =si does not project in the expected
way either. Like alas, it scopes over negation, rather than projecting from under it. That
is, as shown in (36b), negating a sentence with the reportative results in the interpretation
that the speaker was told not p, not, as expected if it did project, that they were told p.
(36) a. phalay-ta=s
fly-acc=rep
ati-n
can-3
‘It can fly.’
ev = speaker has reportative evidence that it can fly
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b. mana=s
not=rep
phalay-ta
fly-acc
ati-n=chu
can-3=neg
‘It can not fly.’
ev= (i) speaker has reportative evidence that it cannot fly
(ii) #speaker has reportative evidence that it can fly
In questions, =si can give rise to two readings (as already discussed in section 2.3). In the
first, it is anchored to the addressee in questions, resulting in the meaning that the speaker
assumes that the addressee knows the answer based on reportative evidence. This is shown
in (37), repeated from (23).
(37) a. Context: A son announces to his father that a young man has come to see him.
The father sends him to let him in and asks:
b. may-manta=s
where-abl=rep
chay
this
runa
man
ka-n-man
be-3-cond
‘Where could this man be from?’ (Itier 1995:290)
In the second, illustrated in (38), repeated from (24), =si conveys that the speaker asks
the question on behalf of someone else.
(38) imayna=s
how=rep
ka-sha-nki
be-prog-2
‘(She says) How are you?’ (Conversation, reconstructed from memory)
Neither reading constitutes a projection of the meaning of =si in questions, as that would
mean that the speaker should be committed to having reportative evidence for p. We cannot
test projection from conditional antecedents, as =si cannot be embedded.
Again, illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative di↵er from both pre-
suppositions and conventional implicatures with respect to projection from holes.
2.6 Projection from plugs
While conventional implicatures behave like presuppositions with respect to holes, they di↵er
with respect to plugs. Plugs are constructions that prevent presuppositions from projecting
(Karttunen 1973), such as propositional attitudes. Presuppositions do not project from
plugs, whereas conventional implicatures do. We already saw this in examples (18), repeated
here as (39).
(39) a. Sue wrongly believes that that jerk Conner got promoted. #In fact, he isn’t a
jerk.
b. Sue wrongly believes that Conner stopped smoking. However, he never smoked
in the first place.
If conventional implicatures were plugged by propositional attitudes, we would expect it to
be possible for the speaker to distance themselves from the conventional implicature, but as
(39a) shows, this is not the case. In contrast, the presupposition that Conner used to smoke
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is in (39b) attributable to Sue, the subject of believe, allowing the speaker to express their
non-commitment to it. The presupposition is therefore not inherited by the entire sentence.
Presuppositions moreover evaporate from conditionals with a presupposition trigger in
the consequent, if their presupposition is entailed by the antecedent (Karttunen 1973:177),
as shown in (40a). This is not the case for conventional implicatures, which cannot be bound
in this way, resulting in overall oddness, (40b).
(40) a. If Ali has a brother, then Ali’s brother is a spy.
b. ??If Ames stole from the FBI, then Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind
bars.
Turning to illocutionary modifiers, alas is not plugged by propositional attitudes, as the
speaker cannot distance themselves from the meaning of alas even when it is embedded under
a propositional attitude, cf. (41), repeated from (19).
(41) Sue believes that Conner, alas, was made redundant. #But I’m happy that he was
made redundant.
And like conventional implicatures, the meaning of alas cannot be plugged in conditional
consequents by making its meaning the antecedent proposition, (42).
(42) ??If I lament that Conner was made redundant, then he was, alas, made redundant.
The reportative implication of =si is not plugged by verbs of saying either, (43), repeated
from (22a), and does also not evaporate from conditional consequents if it is hypothetically
assumed in the antecedent, (44).
(43) chhaynata=taq
then=contr
ni-mu-n-ku
say-cisl-3-pl
kay
this
wiraqocha
gentleman
Carlos
Carlos
Ferrero
Ferrero
kay
this
wiraqocha-wan=sis
gentleman-com=rep
rima-yu-nqa-ku
speak-aug-3.fut-pl
kunan
now
p’unchaw
day
‘Then they say (that) this gentleman Carlos Ferrero, with this gentleman, reportedly,
they will talk today.’ (Radio)
(44) sichus
if
ni-wa-rqa-n
say-1o-pst-3
Juan
Juan
hamu-na-n-ta
come-nmlz-3-acc
chay=qa
then=top
Juan=qa
Juan=top
hamu-nqa=s.
come-3.fut=rep
‘If I was told that Juan will come, then Juan will come.’
ev: s was told that Juan will come (Faller (2002:118), elicited)
Thus, illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conven-
tional implicatures with respect to plugs and contrast with presuppositions.
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at-issue P CI IM =si
answers QUD + – – – –
target of assent/dissent + – – – –
truth-conditional independence – – + + +
SAP-oriented – – s s (or h) s or h
taken for granted – + – varies –
anti-backgrounding + – + – –
escape from holes – + + – –
plugged by plugs + + – – –
Table 1: Table 1: Properties of (not-)at-issue meaning types
2.7 Summary
Table 1 summarises the results of the tests for each of the types of meaning looked at in this
section.
The first main observation here is that the Cuzco Quechua reportative =si patterns
mostly with illocutionary modifiers (IM) like alas, and that both of these are clearly distinct
from both at-issue content and presuppositions (P). Alas and =si di↵er from each other in
two respects: first, in questions, alas, seems to be still conveying that the speaker laments
p, which is assumed to be true, but the meaning of =si is either that the speaker asks the
question on someone else’s behalf or that the addressee is expected to know the answer based
on reportative evidence. The latter, interrogative flip reading, can, however, be observed with
other illocutionary modifiers, so this suggests that alas is subject to additional restrictions
in questions. The first reading, which involves =si taking the entire question act in its scope,
is, however, not observed with any illocutionary modifier, as far as I know. Second, the two
types of element di↵er in whether or not they are necessarily taken for granted. Certain, but
not all illocutionary modifiers, have this requirment – namely those illocutionary modifiers
that specify preparatory felicity conditions – but the reportative does not.
Illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conventional
implicatures (CI) in a good number of properties, but there are also significant di↵erences,
which suggest that they should not be analyzed as conventional implicatures. In partic-
ular, conventional implicatures escape from holes, whereas illocutionary modifiers and the
reportative do not, and conventional implicatures, but not illocutionary modifiers and the
reportative, require anti-backgrounding. Thus, I suggest the addition of a further type of
entailed not-at-issue meaning to taxonomies of meaning types, namely that of illocutionary
entailments.
3 Conventional implicature analyses of reportatives
In the previous section, it was shown that the Quechua reportative and other illocutionary
modifiers are empiricially distinct from conventional implicatures. In this section, I will argue
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that existing analyses of the reportative as a conventional implicature are inadequate also
on theoretical grounds. Potts (2005) develops a typed logic that deals with at-issue content
and conventional implicatures as two di↵erent meaning dimensions. The two dimensions
are truth-conditionally independent of each other, except for the fact that conventional
implicatures take elements from the at-issue dimension as their arguments. The dimensions
can be represented as a tuple of meanings such as (45).13
(45) <p, CI(p)>
Potts (2007b:195) suggests that a conventional implicature analysis of evidentials, in
particular one that classes them with expressives, might be fruitful to explore. Such an
analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative would result in the tuple in (46).
(46) <p, Rep(p)>
However, Potts himself is aware that this analysis would not be appropriate for evidentials
like the Cuzco Quechua reportative, as he asks: ‘But to what extent do they manifest the
independence property? It is generally hard to determine whether a sentence containing a
hedging evidential counts as an assertion of its core propositional content. This judgment
can vary from language to language, even from morpheme to morpheme; see Faller (2002)
and Garrett (2001) for descriptions that are well attuned to the di culty of this issue.’
The problem identified here by Potts is illustrated by (47).
(47) a. pay-kuna=s
she-pl=rep
n˜oqa-man=qa
I-illa=top
qulqi-ta
money-acc
muntu-ntin-pi
lot-incl-loc
saqiy-wa-n
leave-1o-3
p1=‘They leave me a lot of money.’
ev1: s has reportative evidence for p1
b. mana=ma´
not=impr
riki
right
riku-sqa-yki
see-pp-2
ni
not
un
one
sol-ta
Sol-acc
centavo-ta=pis
cent-acc=add
saqi-sha-wa-n=chu
leave-prog-1o-3=neg
p2=‘(But) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol, not one
cent.’
ev2=s has direct evidence for p2 (Conversation)
The speaker of (47) first introduces the proposition that they have left her money into
the discourse under the scope of the reportative and then goes on to deny the truth of
this proposition. It is therefore clear that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the
proposition in (47a), and indeed is committed to its falsity. As speaker commitment to p is
a sincerity condition for an assertion of p, it follows that p in (47a) is not asserted. Potts
assumes that the at-issue content of declarative sentences is asserted. (46) is therefore not
an adequate analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative.
Note that Potts takes this to be a violation of the requirement for independence of truth
values for conventional implicatures. However, if we take the possibility of assenting to p
13For simplicity, (45) assumes a conventional implicature that takes the entire proposition as its argument –
there are conventional implicatures whose scope is only a phrase.
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while dissenting with a not-at-issue expression as a test for truth-conditional independence,
then, as shown in section 2.2, the evidential contribution of the Cuzco Quechua reportative
is truth-conditionally independent of p. Unlike with presuppositions, the truth of p is not
in any way dependent on the truth of the evidential contribution. Without the continuation
in (47b), it is also conceivable that the proposition that they gave her money in (47a) is
true while at the same time it might be false that the speaker was told about it. What is
at-issue here is not truth-conditional independence but rather whether the speaker presents
p as true. That is, the evidential a↵ects the assertability of p by the speaker, not the truth
of p.
Another expression Potts excludes from the set of conventional implicatures based on
this criterion is the parenthetical it seems, because, despite it being intonationally isolated
and syntactically similar to as-parentheticals, it seems cannot be removed from (48) and
leave ‘the at-issue core una↵ected’ (Potts 2005:92).
(48) Max, it seems, is a Martian.
Again, a better characterization of what is a↵ected by it seems is not the at-issue core itself,
but rather whether or not this core is asserted. The conventional implicature analysis is not
adequate for the Cuzco Quechua reportative or for it seems, because it does not allow any
reference to the illocutionary level of meaning, not because the truth of the at-issue content
is dependent on the truth of the evidential.
That the basic analysis of evidentials as conventional implicatures in (46) does not work
for all evidentials because it assumes that the at-issue content is asserted has also been
observed by Portner (2006), and similar considerations have led Zimmermann (2004) to
reject the conventional implicature analysis for the German speech act level epistemic modal
wohl. Being aware of this fundamental problem, McCready (2010) proposes a conventional
implicature analysis for the CQ evidentials based on his extension to Potts’ logic which
introduces a new logical type, namely that of a shunting type. Shunting types are needed
for sentences which contribute only conventional implicature content but have no at-issue
content. An example from English is single-word utterances of expressives such as man in
(49b).
(49) a. A: What’s the weather like outside?
b. B: Man!
McCready (2010) assumes that man here applies to a contextually supplied proposition and
expresses a strong feeling towards this proposition. However, this proposition is not asserted.
Shunting types are ‘types for those semantic objects [such as man] that ‘shunt’ information
from one dimension to another, without leaving anything behind for further modification’
(McCready 2010:18). He stipulates ‘that in cases where a sentence lacks asserted content it
is still interpreted as a 2-tuple, but one with a first (left) element which is always satisfiable.
I will denote this trivial assertion by T’ (McCready 2010:32). Thus, (49b) can be represented
as in (50).
(50) <T, man(p)>
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Shunting types are not only useful for sentences consisting of only a conventional impli-
cature element, but also for elements that take a proposition as their scope, but rather than
leaving this proposition in the at-issue dimension, they take it with them into the conven-
tional implicature dimension. The Japanese adverbial yokumo, (51), is a case in point.
(51) Yokumo
yokumo
Dallas
Dallas
to
with
kekon
marry
sita
did
na
pt
‘He did an amazingly stupid and shocking thing by marrying Dallas.’
Yokumo expresses the speaker’s negative feelings towards the propositional content and that
it is unexpected.14 Most importantly, p=‘He married Dallas’, in (51), is not at-issue, which is
evidenced by the fact that it cannot provide new information and that it cannot be directly
denied. Thus, (51) cannot serve as the answer to the question Who did Austin marry?
(McCready 2010:39), and direct denials such a That’s not true or That’s a lie! are infelicitous
as responses. Thus, in McCready’s terminology, yokumo shunts the at-issue content into the
conventional implicature dimension, and consequently, the conventional implicature content
is the only content conveyed by yokumo sentences, that is, the resulting meaning is (52).
(52) <T, bad(p) ^ surprise(p)>
McCready (2010:48f) suggests that the Cuzco Quechua reportative can be analyzed along
the same lines, and proposes (53) as its semantics.
(53) <T, Hearsay(p)>
This analysis correctly accounts for the fact that p in the scope of the reportative is not
asserted. However, it wrongly predicts that it should not be possible to target p with denials
or for p to serve as the answer to a question. Neither of these predictions is borne out.
Denials of utterances with the reportative are felicitous and only target p, as shown in (54).
(54) a. mana=s
not=rep
phalay-ta
fly-acc
ati-n=chu
can-3=neg
p=‘It cannot fly . . . ’
ev: s was told that p (Conversation)
b. mana=n
not=bpg
chiqaq=chu
true=neg
phalay-ta=puni=n
fly-acc=cert=bpg
ati-n
can-3
‘That’s not true. It can definitely fly. (Constructed)
And (55) shows that reportative utterances can serve to answer questions.
(55) a. hasta
until
illarimuy=kama
dawn=lim
‘Until dawn?’
14Yokumo also presupposes that p has to be believed by the speaker to be in the common ground. This, inci-
dently, shows that there are also elements that convey both presuppositional and conventional implicature
content.
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b. illamuy-ta=n˜a=s
dawn-acc=disc=rep
riqcha-ri-sqa-ku
wake.up-inch-nx.pst-pl
‘They woke up at dawn.’
ev: s was told that they woke up at dawn. (Conversation)
Recall also that, according to Potts (2005), at-issue content carries the main theme of
the discourse or controversial propositions. In Cuzco Quechua, stories are told with the
reportative present in almost every sentence, be they traditional folk tales or stories from
everyday life for which the speaker only has second-hand evidence – see for example the
short excerpt from a news story in (32).
We therefore must allow for the propositions conveyed with the reportative to act as
at-issue content, without, however, requiring that this content be asserted. That is, we must
not identify at-issueness with assertion. Any analysis that achieves this would have to allow
the Cuzco Quechua reportative to have an e↵ect on illocutionary force. The basic idea of
Faller (2002) is that utterances with the Cuzco Quechua reportative do not assert p, but
present or put forward p, that is, p is introduced into the discourse without the speaker
committing to the truth of it. The speech act performed by (1a) would have the following
components (where I have here chosen put for ‘putting forward’ to name this speech act):
(56) a. u: para-mu-sha-n=si.
b. p = It is raining
c. puts(it is raining)
d. sinc: someone else said that p
To maintain compositionality, some modifications to traditional speech act theory are
required. In particular, Faller (2012) suggests that declarative sentences are associated with
put rather than assert, and that the sincerity condition for assertions that the speaker
believes p is only added to put by default when there is no illocutionary modifier (such as
the Cuzco Quechua reportative) that overrides this default. I will not go into the details of
this analysis, as the point for the current paper is to show that the resulting speech act in
(56) correctly captures that the at-issue content introduced under the reportative is at-issue
but not asserted.
4 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper has been to show through a detailed comparison of the empirical
properties of the Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential with those of typical presupposi-
tion and conventional implicature triggers that it cannot be subsumed under either of these
categories. It was also shown that previous proposals of analyzing this evidential as a con-
ventional implicature fail to capture that the proposition it introduces into the discourse
is at-issue, yet not asserted. The Cuzco Quechua reportative behaves in most respects like
elements that are widely assumed to operate on the illocutionary level such as the adverbs
alas and honestly. An analysis of it as an illocutionary modifier (as first proposed in Faller
(2002)) therefore still seems the most appropriate for this marker.
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Potts (2005) develops an upper-layer logic to account for utterance modifiers such as
frankly. The lower-level logic dealing with at-issue content and supplements and expressives
is embedded within this. This architecture is therefore not unlike the hierarchical structure
F (p) of traditional speech act theory. It is conceivable that this upper-layer logic can be
extended to account for elements like the Cuzco Quechua reportative =si. Doing so would
however not alter the fact that it is an illocutionary modifier. In our taxonomies of conven-
tional meaning types, we should therefore include a category of illocutionary entailments,
as opposed to at-issue entailments on the one hand, and to the other types of not-at-issue
entailments, presuppositions and conventional implicatures, on the other.
The Cuzco Quechua reportative di↵ers from alas and honestly in two respects: (i) utter-
ances containing it are not assertions but a weaker form of putting forth a proposition into
the discourse which does not require the speaker to be committed to its truth; (ii) it seems to
be able to take an entire question speech act in its scope, resulting in an interpretation that
a question is asked on someone else’s behalf. Regarding (ii), only an illocutionary analysis
of this evidential would be able to account for this observation, thus providing a further
argument against the conventional implicature analysis. A fully compositional analysis of
this reading as well as the flip reading in questions is still outstanding.
The analysis proposed in Faller (2002) and Faller (2012) captures (i), but it leaves open
the question of how the at-issue content is dealt with in subsequent discourse, that is, whether
and how it a↵ects the common ground. If the speaker does not express their commitment to
p, then what is the point of presenting p at all? Clearly, the speaker still intends to convey
some information. This is especially clear when questions are answered with reportative
utterances or in news reporting contexts. We therefore need to develop an analysis that
separates speaker commitment to p from the ability of p to advance the discourse in an
informative way. Murray (2010, 2014) has studied how Cheyenne evidentials update the
common ground and so her analysis might be applicable to the Cuzco Quechua reportative
as well. (Faller 2007) also provides some discussion of these issues within the framework of
SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003), and it would be worthwhile to explore this further. Most
promising for capturing the above observations, however, seems to me the recent dynamic
theory for speech acts developed by Farkas and Bruce (2010), as it allows the separation of
commitments, what is under discussion and what enters the common ground. In particular
their notion of a Table, which is a stack of propositions currently under discussion/at-issue,
would allow us to capture the idea that propositions under the Cuzco Quechua reportative are
introduced into the discourse for further discussion, that is, put on the table. The individual
discourse participants’ commitments are tracked in separate stacks, and are also distinct
from the common ground, the set of propositions that all discourse participants are publicly
committed to. So, the speaker’s commitment can be kept distinct from the common ground
as well as from the contribution the at-issue content makes to the discourse. Before such
an analysis can be developed, however, the empirical facts about how the at-issue content is
treated in subsequent discourse remain to be established.
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